In two earlier responses to these trials I have maintained that the placebo controls were ethically unacceptable, but that efficacy tests of lower than ACTG 076 levels of zidovudine, with the objective of developing a cheaper drug regimen, are ethically defensible. I was wrong. I have changed my mind largely for the reasons provided in this commentary.Despite Professor Resnik’s explicit reliance on principlism, it seems to me that his argument is essentially of a consequantialist nature. It takes into account the interests of those women affected during the course of the trials, and those women in developing countries who are likely to benefit should the trials succeed in developing a cheaper drug regimen. He argues that trials under consideration were ethical, because the women in the trial would otherwise have had no access to the potentially sucessful HIV intervention zidovudine anyway, and because of the likely benefit to a very large number of HIV positive pregnant women. I agree with Professor Resnik’s philosophical basis for justifying the trials, yet I have different perceptions of the real world of these trials than he has. Given that consequentialist reasoning depends to a large extent on empirical information, it is of considerable importance to get these vital facts straight. In this commentary I will outline my more critical assessment of these trials on the basis of brief analyses of the above mentioned four ethical problems.
1] Placebo controlsI am still unconvinced that placebo controls were necessary. Not being a scientist, I have to rely largely on the judgement of a number of eminent scientists who conduct research clinical AIDS trials, and who have assured me that placebo controls were unnecessary (some of the reasons for this can be found in the article by Lurie and Wolfe). In fact, a strong indication supportive of this judgement can, ironically, be derived from the actual outcome of the trials, which confirmed the beneficial effects of zidovudine as a means of preventing perinatal HIV transmission. Taking into account information I received since publication of my two defences of these trials, I am now much more doubtful about whether they should have ever taken place in developing countries.
2] First person voluntary informed consentProfessor Resnik refers to sources close to UNAIDS as evidence for that the relevant ethics committees have been consulted, that eminent Western bioethicists have attended UNAIDS sponsored meetings, and so on and so forth. Given that UNAIDS had a vested interest in the realisation of these trials, one has reason to be sceptical about the types of experts it consults. The organisation has been supportive of these trials because it considered them a means to develop an affordable means of reducing the perinatal HIV transmisison rates in developing countries. The question ought to be asked whether UNAIDS’ ethics experts were likely to be willing to sacrifice internationally recognised research ethics standards? Did they support arguments put forward by Ijsselmuiden and Faden or Ekunwe, which require very high standards of first person informed consent, or were they prepared to go for the easier option propagated by Christakis? Christakis argues basically that consent of a community representative might suffice if first person informed consent isn’t feasible. Ijselmuiden, Faden and Ekunwe won’t have any of this, largely because they are doubtful of the legitimacy of many such ‘representatives’ in particular in developing countries with a poor human rights record. Nigeria based Ekunwe is adamant that "if the proposed tests are different from routine tests, and carry risks of complications and/or pain, then informed consent must be obtained either verbally or in writing." Evidence that many research subjects in developing countries have not understood what they consented to is mounting not only in currently ongoing UNAIDS supported preventive AIDS vaccine trials, but also for the trials under consideration by Resnik. Phanuphak reported in the New England Journal of Medicine that HIV positive pregnant women who participated in these trials "who sought antenatal care in early pregnancy were not offered complete information or told about the full benefits of the ACTG 076 regimen but, rather, were left untreated until the 36th week of gestation, when they were randomly assigned to the zidovudine or placebo group." If this happened in a developing country such as Thailand, which is a functioning democracy, one must inevitably become concerned about the treatment of research subjects in some of the other participating countries, which have a quite appalling human rights record. An editorial in The Lancet suggests that it is "insulting to imply that approval from an African ethics committee is valueless." Certainly, as a general statement this is correct, yet even Asian and African scholars admit that one of the reasons for conducting trials in developing countries is that often it is easier to gain ethics committee (if there is one at all) approval. Questionable is also the voluntariness of the HIV positive women’s consent. Isn’t it a coercive offer to force terminally ill pregnant women to choose between joining a placebo controlled trial which gives a shot at an established HIV intervention, and no treatment at all? In Western countries such patients have voted with their feet and gone to great length to join such trials only in order to break subsequently the trial protocol. They see trial participation as their only chance at a possible HIV treatment (vs. the placebo which is not even offering this chance). Marc Lallemant, Max Essex and colleagues commented on the zidovudine trials that "clinical research worldwide would be jeopardised if potential participants feared that, within a trial, they risked being denied the most effective treatments available." I think such trials constitute unethical clinical research, irrespective of their scientific rationale. There is no evidence that the trials Professor Resnik defended offered clinical equipoise between the placebo and the zidovudine arms. Similar trials take place currently sponsored by the French INSERM/Agence Nationale de SIDA in Ivory Coast. The objective is to determine whether a drug known in Western countries to prevent pneumonia in people with AIDS, works better than a placebo. The outcome of these trials is as predictable as the outcome of the zidovudine trials, yet AIDS patients in Ivory Coast will pay with their lives for knowledge that is unlikely to surprise anyone. One might argue that patients in these trials are better off than those who were not offered a chance to participate in them, because they were at least given a chance at an established means of preventing HIV transmission or, as in the Ivory Coast trials, pneumonia. At a first glance this argument seems convincing, yet it ignores that the international patent regime, designed to safeguard the economic interests of shareholders of Western pharmaceutical companies, has led to this situation in the first place. In other words, a coalition of Western governments and Western pharmaceutical companies has created a situation that effectively prevents the vast majority of people with AIDS (or other life-threatening illnesses) in developing countries from accessing affordable medication. Subsequently researchers sponsored by these very same governments conduct clinical trials in developing countries which ‘offer’ 50% of the participating trial subjects no treatment at all. To qualify this as ethical, because the other 50% receive an already established medication would open the door to conduct many more trials in developing countries which would be considered unacceptable in developed countries.
3.1 and 3.2] Viability of the economic justification for the trialsProfessor Resnik suggests a further ethical justification of the perinatal HIV transmission trials which is of an economic nature. The argument is essentially that it is legitimate to provide substandard treatments to people in countries where the standard of care is lower or at the level of what would be considered the substandard treatment arm in a Western society. This is, of course, only as long as there is some subsequent benefit for the people in societies which took risks in these trials. This is precisely where the crux of this argument lies. Utilitarians could accept this reasoning because they’d find it justifiable to sacrifice the interests of some few trial participants (who have given informed, and voluntary consent) for the sake of a much larger number of people who might gain as a consequence of this sacrifice. Three questions need to be addressed in this context: